Evolution of a Moral Sense

One of the interesting things I’ve noticed over the years is that scientists who are also believers often tend to resolve theological issues in ways that make the theologians uncomfortable. I can’t call myself a professional theologian, because contrary to what most church members seem to think, theology and Biblical studies are different fields, and indeed are each subdivided into a number of fields themselves.

On the Panda’s Thumb today we have a post on the evolution of altruistic behavior in robots. This is a remarkably interesting post, referencing recent research, and adds to the mounting evidence that many things we might regard as purely spiritual do, in fact, have material causes. In this case we’re dealing with altruism, but the issue goes deeper into the question of right and wrong as opposed to simply beneficial or not for one’s personal survival. That Humanist provided some additional valuable references and pointers.

In the comments, there’s a brief exchange over Dr. Francis Collins’ view that morality is something provided by God, which does not result from evolution. Now I’m not going to engage Dr. Collins’ viewpoint in detail. In fact, his book The Language of God is sitting on my “read real soon” shelf, and I plan to blog my way through that reading, so I will respond then. (Out of the references provided in those various blog entires, I recommend this one from TalkReason.

But the notion that human morality strictly separates us from the animals and that the common elements of human morality point to a God who proclaims morals is one I have encountered before. When I returned to faith after some years away from the church, one of the arguments for the existence of God that impressed me and stuck with me was this argument from universal morals as presented by C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity. Don’t get me wrong here. I did not think this proved that God exists, but rather that it pointed in that direction on balance.

But there are some problems with this view, and they result from elements of Christian theology. First, we have the question of the fall. Essentially, human beings as we see them today are not fully moral as created by God. How does one tell the difference between an imperfectly evolved moral system, and one that was once perfect, but has deteriorated? Thinking on this question has made me relegate that argument way to the bottom of the list.

Second, for free will advocates such as myself, the question arises as to just how the “moral sense” is created consistent with free will. If people have no moral sense naturally, how do the choose anything at all freely? Some would say that God empowers that free will, but I think that leaves us very much in the same place, provided that God empowers people equally. We still have people who are very immoral naturally messing up the sample in which we compare moral standards. Calvinists would see this a bit differently, and yet their doctrine of total depravity makes one wonder precisely how this moral sense is measured and compared.

It seems to me as well that the great distinction between human and animal on the subject of ethics is perhaps somewhat overstated. I will try to look for some references when I get to this point in Collins’ book and respond to that idea in more detail.

These are just pointers to areas to be discussed and worked out. The big issue for me is how this notion becomes any more scientifically testable, and any less of a dead end sign for scientific progress than intelligent design (ID). Gert Korthof says in his review:

Having accepted the evolutionary origin of humans without supernatural intervention, for him the Moral Law is the only property that cannot be explained and will never be explained (!) by Darwinian evolution and the human genome. “Selfless altruism presents a major challenge for the evolutionist” (p.27).

Subject to my own later reading of the source, I have to see this as the same kind of “god of the gaps” approach as ID, and also the same kind of roadblock put in front of scientific investigation. I imagine that Dr. Collins doesn’t intend it in that way, but that’s what it looks like to me.

This is one of the places in which the theistic evolutionist who is honest (I try to be!) must admit that evolutionary theory does have an impact on theology. The idea that humanity is inevitable is incompatible with undirected evolution. It is, of course, possible that there is a configuration of particles at the big bang that must produce the universe that we have, but that is at least theoretically subject to scientific investigation. An alternative is that God does, in fact, play dice with the universe and takes a risk as to what will result. It is my belief that humanity was never inevitable. We are simply that which evolution produced on this planet. What about other planets? In something the size of our universe, I’m guessing life may have happened more than once, and we might find a variety of different types of life, and morals that are quite diverse, but functional for those who follow them.

All of this is quite subject to scientific investigation, and thus we should not assume that a moral sense could not possibly evolve. The problem for many Christians is that this makes God less involved. But I don’t think it makes God less involved. It simply removes one of the ways we might have of distinguishing God’s involvement from his uninvolvement. That may sound like a weird statement, but again if we look to Christian theology, God is infinite and omnipotent. I think those words are problematic, but in any case, God doesn’t have to prioritize. He can be involved in a leaf falling at one end of the universe and a planet forming at the other, and he doesn’t have to rate the two events.

I believe this means that if Christianity is generally right about the nature of God, it follows that God is involved in everything. God’s involvement is merely so consistent that it can be expressed as natural laws. What we look for as “God in action” is something exceptional. But if such exceptional things involve the functioning of the universe, then we would only perceive God in his errors–again an idea that should get on any Christian theologian’s nerves.

How is it problematic to assume that God could create a universe fully gifted and able to produce beings who make moral decisions, just as he creates a universe that can produce life and can diversity that life? I think that we, as Christians would do better not to look for God in inadequacies, but rather to celebrate him in everything.