CIA Prewar Assessments and Fallout

I found the following article interesting but in no way surprising:

Months before the invasion of Iraq, U.S. intelligence agencies predicted that it would be likely to spark violent sectarian divides and provide al-Qaeda with new opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to a report released Friday by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Analysts warned that war in Iraq also could provoke Iran to assert its regional influence and “probably would result in a surge of political Islam and increased funding for terrorist groups” in the Muslim world.

The intelligence assessments, made in January 2003 and widely circulated within the Bush administration before the war, said that establishing democracy in Iraq would be “a long, difficult and probably turbulent challenge.” The assessments noted that Iraqi political culture was “largely bereft of the social underpinnings” to support democratic development. (Source: Washington Post via MSNBC

They obviously got all that right. I had been wondering how the experts could have missed the obvious problems with the rosy view of democratization resulting in a stable and peaceful new Iraq. It seems that they didn’t do quite that badly. They were excessively optimistic, however, on how long it would take to clean up and on the oil revenues that would result.

The fact is that the war, as it stands, is a defeat. I would argue, however, that it is not a military defeat, but a political one. The objectives were not attainable. Every reasonable military objective has been obtained. The idea of going into Iraq and removing weapons of mass destruction or of toppling the nasty regime of Saddam Hussein were both obtainable goals. There were no weapons of mass destruction, so nobody could do that. Saddam Hussein has been toppled.

At this point, our problem is that we’re expecting our military to create a democratic society, something they are in no way equipped to do. I cannot imagine how our government thought this would work. In an off-hand conversation the other day, I commented that it might be possible given a decade and perhaps 1.5 million troops. But even then I would suggest that the only option would be to create a strong and hopefully benevolent dictatorship or oligarchy favorable to our goals.

As it is, we are trying to support a government that has next to no chance at all in its present form. Further, no likely governing group is Iraq is likely to fulfill all our goals, i.e. being a free government and suppressing international terrorism.

In the 21st century style of war, the war on terror, we need greater strategic flexibility. Right now we need credible force to use in negotiating with countries such as Iran and North Korea. Because we are tied up trying to do the impossible in Iraq, we don’t really have the necessary force available.

None of this–none whatsoever–is the fault of the troops who have done an extraordinary job in the face of the muddled and ill-considered objectives they were given. They should come back to victory parades, not because we as a nation have won, but because they have done even better than that. They have fought hard and effectively even without and end in sight.

During the first gulf war, I knew approximately when I was coming home. Oh, there was the standard military shuffling of the paperwork, but then soon I was on a plane. We came home to wonderful welcome. Stores were offering discounts and everyone was celebrating. We had been in what the U.S. population likes–a short, victorious war with very light casualties. I was and am proud to have served.

Our troops right now deserve no less. In fact, they deserve much more. They have labored through the heat of the day. Not only that, we need them for the future, and we need more volunteers like them. What is missing in the current debate over getting out of Iraq is any sense of further strategy for the war on terror. When we leave Iraq, no matter what the circumstances, radical Islam will still exist, terrorism will still exist, and there will still be states supporting terrorism. What are we going to do about them.

Having muddled and impossible goals is bad. But having no goals at all is even worse. A strategy of reacting to individual acts of terrorism is not going to win the battle. Money will have to be spent on technology and personnel to improve security. We’re going to need the troops many more times. We need to be thinking about that.